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 VPIN rarely signals abnormal illiquidity.  
 VPIN only occasionally anticipates price changes leading to actual trading halts.  
 The capacity of VPIN to anticipate truly toxic events is limited. 
 VPIN limits cannot substitute traditional price limits. 
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Abstract 
We study if VPIN (Easley, López de Prado, and O’Hara, 2012, Review of 
Financial Studies 25, 1457-1493) is an efficient advance indicator of 
toxicity-induced liquidity crises and related sharp price movements. We find 
that high VPIN readings rarely signal abnormal illiquidity, and very 
occasionally anticipate large intraday price changes leading to actual trading 
halts. We find significant differences in illiquidity and price impact between 
VPIN-identified toxic and non-toxic halts, but they tend to vanish when we 
control for ex ante realized volatility. We conclude that the capacity of 
VPIN to anticipate truly toxic events is limited.  
JEL Classification: G10 
Keywords: VPIN; BVC; circuit breakers; trading halts; price limits; order 














In a series of related papers, Easley, López de Prado, and O’Hara (hereafter ELO) 
introduce a metric of order flow toxicity called Volume-Synchronized Probability of 
Informed Trading (VPIN).
2
 Order flow is regarded as toxic when it adversely selects liquidity 
providers. VPIN is expected to increase when information events induce unbalanced and 
accelerated trades over relatively short intervals. High VPIN readings are presumed to concur 
with or precede illiquidity shortfalls; subsequently short-term volatility peaks.  
Using ultra-high frequency data on future contracts, ELO (2011a) find that VPIN achieved 
abnormally high values in the hours preceding the Flash Crash of May 6, 2010. Also, ELO 
(2012a) find that short-term volatility is often substantial within VPIN-identified toxic 
periods. Encouraged by these promising findings, ELO (2012a) recommend that market 
authorities use VPIN to monitor markets in real time, and eventually trigger a trading halt 
whenever VPIN signals that liquidity provision is at risk. Circuit breakers often use price 
limits as triggers.
3
 In a recent report (see UKGOS, 2012), the UK Government Office of 
Science advocates for new forward-looking types of circuit breakers that would use early 
warning signals as triggers. ELO (2012a) claim that circuit breaker programs triggered by 
VPIN limits could have this preventive capacity.  
We evaluate ELO’s proposal by addressing the core question of whether VPIN is a valid 
proxy and/or a reliable leading indicator for order flow toxicity. Failing to document a strong 
link between high VPIN readings and both contemporaneous and ex-post liquidity 
withdrawals would call into question the use of VPIN limits to trigger circuit breakers. 
Previous studies focus on the lead-lag relationship between VPIN and ex-post short-term 
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 See ELO (2011a, 2011b, 2012a, 2012b, 2014, 2015, and 2016).  
3
 An example is the “limit-up, limit-down” (LULD) approved as a response to the Flash Crash (see SEC release 
34-67091, May 31, 2012). In Europe, similar systems have been in place for a long time now (see Abad and 















 However, ELO (2012a) themselves note that not all volatility is due to toxicity. 
So, volatility-based tests do not provide a satisfactory answer to the question of whether 
VPIN does signal toxic order flow. Instead, we evaluate VPIN using objective measures of 
liquidity and adverse selection costs.  
We contribute to the literature in several ways. First, we analyze trading activity, liquidity, 
and realized volatility around VPIN-limit violations using close-in-time VPIN-identified non-
toxic days as a benchmark. We show that VPIN limits are triggered by sudden rises in trading 
volume. Consistent with previous studies, we also find that VPIN-limit hits often precede 
extraordinary increases in realized volatility. However, relative spreads after VPIN-limit hits 
are rarely out of the ordinary, and there are no significant changes in the limit order book 
depth. So, VPIN-identified toxic events do not appear that toxic when judged by objective 
measures. 
Second, we test if VPIN-limit violations anticipate truly toxic events. Earlier studies 
examine whether VPIN succeeds in signaling extraordinary events, like the Flash Crash (e.g., 
ELO, 2012a) or single-stock mini-flash crashes (e.g., Pöppe et al., 2016). Despite the sharp 
price disruptions associated with these crashes, case studies of unique events do not suffice to 
judge the effectiveness of any metric as an early-warning signal. Instead, we test VPIN’s 
anticipatory capacity by means of a large sample of recurrent, potentially toxic, single-stock 
events triggered by unusually large intraday price changes. Namely, our exercise involves 
6,740 trading halts for 45 stocks listed in an electronic order-driven market over 12 years.  
We start by analyzing how often VPIN-signaled toxic events comprise actual trading halts 
(hereafter, toxic halts). We find that toxic halts represent only 4.5% to 9.9% of all halts, 
depending on the VPIN parameterization. The immediate regulatory implication of this 
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 See ELO (2012a), Andersen and Bondarenko (2014), Low, Li, and Marsh (2016), Pöppe, Moos, and Schiereck 













finding is that VPIN-limits can at most complement, but never substitute, price limits. 
Moreover, during toxic periods with no price-limit hits, the largest intraday price movements 
observed are remarkably lower than the minimum intraday price variations market authorities 
are willing to tolerate. 
Next, we examine if VPIN-identified toxic halts are truly toxic. We find that the abnormal 
realized spread (depth) tends to be higher (lower) around toxic-halts than around non-toxic 
halts. Moreover, the average price impact of trades, a common proxy for adverse selection 
costs, shows higher abnormal values around toxic halts than around non-toxic halts. Yet, 
when we control for ex ante differences in volatility, most of the anticipatory capacity of 
VPIN vanishes. In general, our analysis renders limited support for VPIN’s preventive 
capacity.      
Our study reveals that VPIN limits would miss most of the intraday price movements that 
ultimately lead to price-limit hits. Being imperfect substitutes, we recommend market 
authorities not to replace price limits with VPIN limits. Moreover, authorities must be aware 
that circuit breakers triggered by VPIN limits could have a high false positive rate in 
foreseeing truly toxic illiquidity-driven volatility peaks. Since they would not know ex ante 
which VPIN-limit hits are due to toxicity, executing a VPIN-based circuit breaker could 
impose a high cost in terms of disrupting the normal functioning of markets with no apparent 
benefit. 
VPIN has been the subject of a heated academic debate. Opponents have questioned every 
finding in ELO's papers. Above them all, Andersen and Bondarenko (2014, 2015) find that 
VPIN has no incremental predictive power on short-term volatility beyond trading intensity 
and volatility itself. The bulk-volume classification (BVC) scheme, introduced by ELO 
(2012a) to estimate order imbalances within the VPIN approach, is also the object of severe 













tick-based algorithm (TBA) can be, independent studies (e.g., Chakrabarty, Pascual, and 
Shkilko, 2015, Andersen and Bondarenko, 2015, and Pöppe et al., 2016) show that TBAs 
outperform BVC. Despite the controversy, VPIN has already been used in several studies 
assuming is a solid indicator for order-flow toxicity.
5
 Our findings question the reliability of 
the metric. 
This study is related to Andersen and Bondarenko (2014, 2015), Chakrabarty et al. (2015), 
and Pöppe et al. (2016), who also evaluate the VPIN. They focus on the lead-lag relationship 
between VPIN and volatility. Instead, our emphasis is on the more fundamental question of 
whether VPIN can be called a metric of order flow toxicity. Our study is also connected to 
Bhattacharya and Chakrabarti (2014), Cheung, Chou, and Lei (2015), and Phuensane and 
Williams (2016). Like us, they evaluate VPIN using recurrent events: IPOs, mandatory calls, 
and episodes of manipulation, respectively. Unlike them, we do not presume the events of 
interest are toxic. Instead, we test whether VPIN-signaled toxic halts really differ from non-
toxic halts.  
Last but not least, our analysis is based on high-frequency quote and trade data from the 
electronic trading platform of the Spanish Stock Exchange (SSE). The SSE has some features 
that make it ideal for our study. It is the least fragmented of the major EU stock exchanges. 
Up to January 2013, the SSE market share on the Spanish large caps was above 90%. On 
December 2013, it fell to 84%. Therefore, our database contains a large majority of all the 
trades for the SSE-listed stocks. In highly fragmented markets such as the US, it is a 
challenge to compute VPIN with data from a single trading platform (e.g., Chakrabarty et al., 
2015). Consolidated files also suffer from integrity problems (e.g., Holden and Jacobsen, 
2014; O’Hara, 2015; Upson, Johnson, and McInish, 2015). Moreover, our sample spans 
twelve years and thousands of trading halts. A similar task centered on the recent US single-
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 See Bhattacharya and Chakrabarti (2014), Borochin and Rush (2016), ELO (2015), McInish et al. (2014), and 













stock circuit breaker program, for example, would be nowadays unfeasible (e.g., Cui and 
Gozluklu, 2016).       
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we provide methodological 
details. In Section 3, we describe the database and provide market background. In Section 4, 
we characterize the VPIN-signaled toxic periods. In section 5, we study liquidity and 
volatility around VPIN-limit violations. In Section 6, we examine if VPIN can anticipate 
truly toxic events. In Section 7, we summarize the robustness tests. Finally, in Section 8 we 
conclude. 
2. Implementing VPIN 
VPIN is a moving average of the absolute order imbalance over the most recent n volume 














,     [1] 
where the subscript  1,...,  n  represents the volume buckets, and ( ) n  is the last bucket; 
iV  is the size (in shares) of each bucket, and iOI  is the order imbalance in the τ-th bucket, 
that is, the difference between the volume of trades initiated by buyers ( BiV ) and the volume 
of trades initiated by sellers ( SiV ). VPIN is defined in volume time rather than clock time in 
an attempt to capture pieces of new information of comparable relevance arriving to the 
marketplace (ELO, 2012a). 
The VPIN level depends on parameter choices. Therefore, it has to be evaluated in 
relative terms to its own history. Following ELO (2012a), we use the empirical CDF of VPIN 
to convert each VPIN reading into a cumulated probability (hereafter, relative VPIN). A toxic 













and Bondarenko (2015), we set p = 0.99. A toxic period ends when the relative VPIN crosses 
up-bottom a second threshold q = 0.85. We choose q low enough to prevent nested short-
lived toxic events that essentially constitute the same event. 
ELO (2011a, 2012a) fix the number of volume buckets (n) at 50; we also consider n = 25 
and 75. As Andersen and Bondarenko (2015), we compute iV  as a percentage (δ) of the 
average daily volume over the previous month. In this way, we account for the pronounced 
rise in daily volume within our sample period. We fix δ at 1/50. According to ELO (2012a), 
VPIN should be robust to a wide range of choices of n and δ. To generate a bucket, we 
aggregate consecutive trades till the accumulated volume is iV . If a trade is for a size greater 
than needed to fill the bucket, the excess size is assigned to the next bucket. 
To estimate the iOI  in eq. [1], we consider two alternatives. First, as suggested by ELO 
(2016), we use the BVC approach.
 
We pre-aggregate volume into bars of a given size. Then, 
we estimate the buy volume ( ˆ
B










V V ,     [2] 
where bV  is the aggregated volume; 1  b b bp p p  is the price change between two 
consecutive bars, where  pb is the price of the last trade in bar b;  p  is the volume-weighted 
standard deviation of  bp , and  .  is the CDF of the probabilistic distribution assumed for 
 b pp . The relative weights of buy and sell volume within a bar depend on how large  bp
is relative to the assumed distribution of price changes.  
BVC-based iOI  estimates and, thus, VPIN estimates, depend on the choice of the type 













volume bars. We consider time bars from 30 to 1800 seconds in increments of 30 seconds. 
Volume and trade bar sizes are stock-specific to account for differences in the average daily 
trading activity across assets and overtime. Volume (trade) bar sizes are computed as the 
closest integer to iυV  ( iυT ), υ  varying between 1% and 40% in increments of 1%. iT  is the 
average daily number of trades over the preceding month.  
Regarding the distribution of  b pp , ELO (2011a) and Andersen and Bondarenko 
(2014) assume normality. More recently, however, ELO (2016) and Wu et al. (2013) suggest 
t-student distributions with 0.25 and 1 degree of freedom, respectively. Our main results are 
independent on this particular choice. Without loss of generality, we provide results with the 
t-student with 0.25 degrees of freedom. 
In the Appendix, we summarize all our parameter choices for the BVC, resulting in 840 
different estimates of VPIN and 1680 different sets of toxic events per stock. Hereafter, we 
will refer to the VPIN with BVC simply as “VPIN”. 
Second, our database contains and initiator flag. So, we can compute VPIN using the 
actual initiator-based order imbalance (hereafter, VPIN-flag). Evaluating the performance of 
VPIN-flag is important for several reasons. On the one hand, there is no need to calibrate 
unobserved parameters; determine the proper type of bars, or their size; choose an underlying 
distribution for the changes in prices, etc. The resulting VPIN-flag is unique given the 
starting point of the series. On the other hand, the trade initiator plays a fundamental role in 
market microstructure, with literally hundredths of empirical studies relying on it (or 
estimates of it). Even in the VPIN literature, VPIN-flag has already been used by several 
papers, including Andersen and Bondarenko (2015), Chakrabarty et al. (2015), Panayides, 
Shohfi, and Smith (2014), and Pöppe et al. (2016). Recently, ELO (2016) strongly object to 













presence of high-frequency trading (HFT). However, in ELO (2012a), they state that “the 
trade-classification algorithm itself is independent of the VPIN metric” and “any algorithm 
could be used to provide input to the estimation of VPIN” (p. 1465). 
3. Market background and data 
We use 12 years (2002-2013) of intraday trade and quote high-frequency data from the 
electronic trading platform of the SSE, called Sistema de Interconexión Bursatil Español 
(SIBE). According to the World Federation of Exchanges, in 2013 the SSE was the fifth 
exchange by domestic market capitalization, and the third by total value of share trading in 
the Europe-Africa-Middle East Region. The SIBE handles the trading activity of the most 
liquid Spanish stocks. Trading is continuous from 9:00 am to 5:30 pm GMT+1, with regular 
call auctions at the opening (8:30-9:00 am) and closing (5:30-5:35 pm). We only use data 
from the continuous trading phase.  
Our database comprises limit order book (LOB) and trade files. LOB files include 
snapshots of the five best ask and bid quotes, updated after each order submission, revision, 
or cancellation. For each quote, we know the displayed depth, but not the hidden volume due 
to iceberg orders (e.g., Pardo and Pascual, 2012). Liquidity supply depends entirely on the 
LOB since there are not designated market makers. For each trade, we know its price, its 
direction (i.e., buy or sell), its size, and the best quotes prevailing before the trade. We only 
keep ordinary trades. We exclude trade registers containing the allocation price and volume 
of the corresponding auction. Time stamps in both files are in hundredths of a second 
(milliseconds after June 2013). Trade and LOB files can be perfectly matched using common 
sequence code. 
We consider stocks that traded continuously during at least three years within our sample 













time. We drop temporarily delisted stocks or stocks with prices below one euro. Our final 
sample consists of 45 stocks. In Table I, Panel A, we provide cross-sectional average daily 
statistics for the whole sample and the ten largest and ten smallest stocks. In Table 1, Panel B, 
we provide cross-sectional average statistics on the evolution of trading activity and liquidity 
over the sample period. 
[Table 1] 
Trades (volume) grew by 257% (62.9%) between 2002 and 2013. Despite the short-sale 
ban in place from July 23, 2012, to January 31, 2013, most of that growth happened post-
MiFID (2008-2013). Trade size halved, mostly post-MiFID. Message traffic (i.e., order 
submissions, revisions, and cancellations) experienced an extraordinary 1,958% increase, 
suggesting more intense HFT activity (e.g., Angel, Harris, and Spatt, 2011). Message traffic 
per trade, a common proxy for HFT (e.g., Hendershott, Jones, and Menkveld, 2011), raised 
323.7% post-MiFID.  
Regarding liquidity, the relative spread halved over the sample period. As it happened 
worldwide (e.g., Beber and Pagano, 2013), SSE relative spreads increased during the recent 
financial crisis, but they decreased 14.81% over the post-MiFID period. LOB depth raised 
273.27% during the pre-MiFID period but decreased 300% post-MiFID. A staged program 
initiated in May 2009 to reduce the tick size from 0.01 to 0.001 or 0.005, depending on the 
stock price, could partly explain this structural change (e.g., Goldstein and Kavajecz, 2000). 
Reduced tick sizes cheapened competition for price priority, tightening the book near the best 
quotes (see “dispersion” in Table 1). We control for tick size changes in posterior analyses.  
Since May 2001, the SSE implements a single-stock circuit-breaking mechanism to 
handle episodes of extraordinary volatility. It consists of “static” and “dynamic” price limits 













maximum permitted variation around the allocation price of the last auction (the last trade 
price). Price ranges are revised every month based on the stock’s volatility over the last six 
months. Non-regular revisions may also occur.  
A volatility auction starts when an incoming order is about to execute at a price at or 
above (below) the upper (lower) price limit. It lasts five minutes plus a random end of at most 
thirty seconds to avoid price manipulation. Never mechanically extended, discretionary 
extensions may happen. We find 50 cases, lasting about 27 minutes on average. They do not 
drive our results. After the auction, new price limits are set around the allocation price. While 
a violation of the static price limit implies a remarkable intraday variation in the stock price, a 
violation of the dynamic price limit may happen because a single incoming aggressive order 
encounters an unusually thin book. Within our sample, there are 6,740 price limit violations; 
3,794 (56.3%) dynamic, and 2,946 (43.7%) static. During ordinary times, static ranges vary 
from 4% to 8%, but ranges up to 20% have been imposed under extreme market turmoil, like 
October 2008. Dynamic ranges fluctuate between 1% and 10%. For a given stock, the 
dynamic range is always smaller than or equal to the static range.  
4. Toxic events 
In Table 2, we provide cross-sectional summary statistics on the number and persistence 
of VPIN-identified toxic events. For each bar type, we provide cross-sectional medians across 
different bar sizes. VPIN signals 30 to 46 toxic events per stock. The median toxic event 
comprises between 55 and 78 buckets. Using time bars, toxic events persist about five hours 
in average, two hours less than using trade or volume bars. As a result, intraday toxic events 
are less common with volume/trade bars than with time bars.
6
 VPIN-flag identifies 7 toxic 
events per stock of much longer average duration (447 buckets). The lengthy duration of 
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 The accuracy of BVC depends on the average number of trades within a bar (Chakrabarty et al., 2015) and the 
variability in the number of trades across bars (ELO, 2016). Differences in accuracy across bar types could 













toxic events might be of some concern. Being a moving average, VPIN might keep signaling 
high toxicity after a VPIN-triggered halt even when the halt succeeds in restoring regular 
trading.  
[Table 2] 
We wonder if different VPIN parameterizations result in the same VPIN-limit violations. 
As the VPIN performance must ultimately depend on the accuracy of the order flow 
imbalance estimates, our focus is on the BVC parameters. In Panel A of Table 3, we change 
the bar size within each bar type. In Panel B of Table 3, we vary the bar type. In each case, 
we randomly pick two different VPIN specifications and obtain the percentage of overlapped 
events. We repeat this process 200 times, and compute median statistics across random pairs. 
[Table 3] 
From Table 3, we learn that the VPIN performance as a trigger is contingent upon BVC 
parameter choices. In Panel A, we show that the percentage of overlapping toxic events 
across bar sizes varies between 58.35% for volume bars and 70.72% for time bars. VPIN 
specifications disagree more when we randomly pick distant bars. For example, the 
percentage of overlapped toxic events for trade bars is 77.3%  (52.8%) when the difference 
between bar sizes is less (more) than 10% (20%) of the average daily number of trades. In 
Panel B, we show that VPIN is highly sensitive to changes in the type of bar. For example, 
only 29% (47%) of the toxic events identified using time bars are found to be toxic using 
volume (trade) bars.  
Our results agree with previous studies suggesting that VPIN is sensitive to parameter 













ELO’s (2012a) claim that the bar size must have a minor influence on the value of VPIN.
7
 
Recognizing that the performance of price limits is also contingent on choices such as the 
reference price or the allowed price range, our findings thus far do not necessarily undermine 
VPIN as a trigger. However, they stress the need to carefully tune the metric. We will address 
the optimal calibration of VPIN in the robustness section. For the rest of the paper, we will 
use uniform bar types and sizes for all stocks. 
5. VPIN as a proxy for order flow toxicity 
According to ELO (2012a), VPIN-limit violations signal the highest relative levels of 
order flow toxicity within our sample period. According to the adverse selection costs 
literature (e.g., O’Hara, 1995; Foucault, Pagano, and Röell, 2013), VPIN-limit hits should 
precede extraordinary liquidity withdrawals and, as a result, peaks in short-term volatility. In 
this section, we evaluate the reliability of VPIN as a proxy for order flow toxicity by testing 
the expected connection between VPIN-limit hits and illiquidity.  
As an initial test, we examine cross-sectional average abnormal illiquidity levels around 
VPIN-limit violations. For each VPIN-limit hit, we compute trading activity, liquidity, and 
realized volatility statistics for 24 five-minute intervals centered on the time of the VPIN-
limit violation. We exclude intervals that start after the estimated termination of the toxic 
event. We compute realized volatility (RV) as the standard deviation of the one-minute 
returns within a given interval. As liquidity metrics, we use the relative spread (RS), that is, 
the quoted bid-ask spread divided by the quote midpoint, the average depth in euros at the 
market quotes (DB), and the average accumulated depth in euros at the five best ask and bid 
quotes of the LOB (DK), all of them averaged weighting by time. For trading activity metrics, 
we use the volume in shares (VOL) and the number of trades (TRD). Abnormal market 
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 ELO (2012a) rely on a limited exercise with only time bars, a single asset (the E-min S&P500), and a single 













conditions are evaluated as follows: for each event, we use the closest non-toxic 250 days 
with the same tick regime as benchmark; then, we standardize each metric by subtracting its 
mean and dividing by its standard deviation over the benchmark days and during the same 
time interval. 
In Figure 1, we plot the estimated cross-sectional average abnormal levels for VPIN, with 
selected uniform bar sizes, and VPIN-flag. Our findings are robust across bar sizes. Thus, we 
provide results for VPIN with 60-second time bars, and volume and trade bars of size υ =2%. 
In Figure 1.a, we show that VPIN-limit violations happen because of abrupt jumps in volume 
within the last five minutes (t=-1). With time bars, for example, VOL deviates from the 
benchmark mean 16.48 times the benchmark standard deviation (hereafter, STD). Abnormal 
levels persist shortly after the VPIN-limit violation, but they are never as high as in t=-1. 
TRD (not reported) increases much less than VOL, revealing that VPIN limits are ultimately 
hit by an unusual concentration of relatively large trades. 
[Figure 1] 
In Figure 1.b, we show that high VPIN readings precede short-lived abnormally high 
volatility realizations (RV), consistent with ELO (2012a), but they are also headed by extreme 
RV readings. Namely, RV progressively increases before the VPIN-limit is hit, peaks either 
immediately before (for time and trade bars) or immediately after (for volume bars and 
VPIN-flag) the hit, and then quickly falls below pre-hit levels. Therefore, Figure 1.b 
documents a strong contemporaneous correlation between VPIN and realized volatility.  
We should expect extraordinary liquidity withdrawals after VPIN-limit violations. 
Although liquidity declines on average, the change in RS reported in Figure 1.c is less 
dramatic and persistent than expected. For VPIN, RS is 0.7 to 1.04 STD above the benchmark 













of toxic order flow. Immediately after VPIN-limit violations, RS reaches a maximum of 1.06 
(0.85) STD for volume (time) bars, to quickly fall below pre-hit levels. For VPIN-flag, we 
find no remarkable deviation in RS from the benchmark levels. Regarding quoted depth, 
Figure 1.d shows that DB before the VPIN-limit hit is only slightly below ordinary levels 
when we use volume bars. After the hit, it decays, but the drop is either not statistically 
significant (VPIN) or remains above ordinary levels (VPIN-flag). The patterns we obtain for 
abnormal DK (not reported) are similar.  
The low average correlation between high VPIN readings and illiquidity suggests that 
VPIN often fails as an indicator of order flow toxicity. To gain further insights on this core 
issue, we take a closer look at liquidity and volatility around each VPIN-limit hit. Per stock-
event, we take the same 250 benchmark days as before, split their trading sessions into 













 percentiles of the resulting empirical distribution. 
We classify RS or RV (DK) as “extraordinary” if it exceeds (is lower than) a focal RHS 
(LHS) benchmark percentile. Under the null of ordinary market conditions, RS should be 
found to be extraordinary with respect to the, for example, 95
th
 benchmark percentile in about 
5% of the VPIN-signaled toxic events. 
In Table 4, we provide the proportion of VPIN-limit hits preceded or followed by 
extraordinary illiquidity and volatility levels for a 30-minute window centered on each VPIN-
limit hit and split into five-minute intervals. We also provide average deviations with respect 
to the benchmark percentiles across all toxic events. 
[Table 4] 
We first look at RV. Consistent with Figure 1, VPIN-limit violations often precede 













immediately followed by extreme volatility with respect to the 99
th
 benchmark percentile in 
39.1% of the events. Somewhat unexpected is that RV is often high before extreme VPIN 
realizations. With time bars, 49.56% of the events are shortly preceded by extremely high RV. 
Andersen and Bondarenko (2015, p.39) conclude that VPIN has predictive power on future 
volatility “due to its correlation with realized volatility, which arises from the use of price 
changes to infer order imbalance” (i.e., BVC). Our findings are consistent with their 
conclusions. Indeed, the connection between VPIN-flag and RV is much weaker than that 
between VPIN (with BVC) and RV, with only 12.89% (9.14%) of the limit hits being 
followed (preceded) by extraordinarily high realized volatility. 
We now turn our attention to our main concern: liquidity. Table 4 reveals that most of the 
VPIN-limit hits are not toxicity-driven. Using BVC (Panel A to C), we find RS in the [0 5) 
interval to be above the 99
th
 benchmark percentile in 12.2%-14.09% of the toxic events. The 
occurrence of extreme RS readings declines in posterior intervals. The rate of success of 
VPIN in anticipating liquidity shocks is therefore much lower than that obtained for realized 
volatility. Special mention deserves VPIN-flag, for which RS is rarely above the 99th 
benchmark percentile. Our findings therefore question the toxic nature of many of the VPIN-
signaled volatility peaks. 
With respect to the depth dimension of liquidity, captured by DK, liquidity following 
VPIN-limit hits is nothing but ordinary. For VPIN with time bars (Panel A), the rate of 
success for the [0 5) interval, with respect to the 1
st
 benchmark percentile, is only 3.28%. 
With volume bars (Panel B) and trade bars (Panel C), post-event DK is extraordinarily low in 
only 4.73-5.01% of the occasions. VPIN-flag (Panel D) renders the lowest rate of success, 
2.39%.   
To sum up, according to ELO (2011a, 2012a), high VPIN readings signal that order flow 













provision should be at risk. Contradictorily, our analysis shows that liquidity providers do not 
withdraw from the market soon after a VPIN-limit hit. The severe short-lived increases in 
short-term volatility we do observe after VPIN-limit hits rarely follow exceptionally high 
illiquidity. In other words, VPIN-identified events do not appear that toxic when judged by 
objective measures. Our findings question the reliability of VPIN as a proxy for order-flow 
toxicity and cast doubt on the appropriateness of halting the continuous trading session after 
every VPIN-limit hit.  
6. VPIN as an early warning signal for toxic events 
We have corroborated that within VPIN-identified periods of high and persistent toxicity 
volatility is often substantial. Since price limits are hit by unusually large price movements, 
periods of high and persistent toxicity might also comprise actual trading halts. However, 
ELO (2012a, 2014) argue that extreme volatility should not always be preceded by high 
VPIN levels, since not all volatility is due to toxicity. Accordingly, trading halts that do not 
fall within toxic periods should be of a different nature than those that do fall. In this section, 
we formally test this hypothesis.  
In Figure 2, we plot cross-sectional average abnormal levels of the relative spread (RS), 
volume in shares (VOL), and realized volatility (RV) around static (Figure 2.a) and dynamic 
(Figure 2.b) halts. We consider twenty-four five-minute intervals centered on each trading 
recession. As the benchmark, we take the 250 days closest in time to the event day with no 
trading halts and the same tick regime. We do not control for toxicity because, as previously 
shown, the same day could be toxic or non-toxic depending on the particular parameterization 
of VPIN we choose. We standardize each observation using the benchmark values for the 
same metric over the same five-minute interval. Figure 2 uncovers the different nature of the 













contrast, dynamic halts are the result of liquidity shortfalls that enhance RV. For both static 
and dynamic halts, RS reaches its highest point right after the halt. Abnormal market 
conditions persist at least one hour after the continuous session resumes.  
[Figure 2] 
We proceed to evaluate if, according to VPIN, the abnormal volatility found around SSE 
trading halts is due to order flow toxicity. We drop six halts that occur before the 
corresponding VPIN series is initiated, that is, before we collect the first 50 volume buckets. 
We are left with 6,734 halts, 2,943 of which are static. We classify a trading halt as “toxic” if 
it totally or partially falls within the limits of a toxic period. In Table 5 Panel A, we show that 
the majority of the SSE halts happen in periods of no remarkable toxicity. Depending on the 
bar type, VPIN classifies between 7.19% and 9.7% of the trading halts as toxic. If we control 
for the type of halt, VPIN classifies 5.47%-11.69% of the static halts and 6.81%-8.52% of the 
dynamic halts as toxic. According to VPIN-flag, only 4.44% of the halts are toxic. 
[Table 5] 
In Panel B of Table 5, for toxic events that comprise at least one trading halt, we provide 
the average distance from the VPIN-limit hit to the closest price-limit hit. We exclude 
overnight periods, holidays, and weekends. A VPIN-limit violation precedes the closest toxic 
halt by about 78 minutes for time bars, more than 3 hours for volume bars, and more than 15 
hours for VPIN-flag. As a result, the percentage of toxic halts occurring during the session in 
which the VPIN limit is reached decreases from 48.82% for VPIN with time bars to 7.7% for 
VPIN-flag.  
We conclude that VPIN limits miss most of the abnormal intraday price movements 
leading to price-limit hits. Even if we are willing to accept that high VPIN readings could 













that only a few of the SSE halts are actually anticipated by VPIN-limit violations. Therefore, 
VPIN limits can complement but never replace traditional price limits.  
A plausible explanation for our finding is that only a few of the SSE trading halts, those 
identified by VPIN, are actually triggered by order flow toxicity. An alternative explanation 
is that VPIN-identified toxic periods comprise actual halts just by chance. The rest of this 
section is directed to discern which of these explanations gets greater support in our data. 
In Table 6, we compare standardized liquidity (RS, DK) and realized volatility (RV) 
around VPIN-identified toxic halts vs. non-toxic halts. We also provide statistics on a 
commonly used metric of adverse selection costs – the trade-size weighted average price 
impact of trades (PI). The price impact of a trade is computed as the difference between the 
quote midpoint one minute after the trade and the quote midpoint prevailing before the trade. 
In this case, we standardize the variables using the 250 days closest in time to the event (i.e., 
halt) day, with the same tick regime, no trading halts, and no toxicity (i.e., relative 
VPIN<0.9). We provide results for static halts only.
8
 Our focus is on the 15-minute window 
before the price-limit hit and the 15-minute window after the resumption of the continuous 
session.  
[Table 6] 
For VPIN, we find RV around toxic halts to be significantly higher than around non-toxic 
halts. Illiquidity, as measured by RS, is also relatively higher around toxic halts. Regarding 
LOB depth, we find that DK is significantly lower around toxic halts, but only with trade or 
volume bars. These findings suggest that VPIN might occasionally succeed as an early 
warning signal for truly toxic events. Consistently, PI is significantly higher around toxic 
halts than around non-toxic halts. For VPIN-flag, however, our findings show that this metric 
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fails as an advanced indicator of toxicity. No significant differences in volatility, liquidity, or 
price impact emerge between VPIN-flag identified toxic and non-toxic halts. 
Although our findings in Table 6 provide some support to VPIN-based circuit breakers, 
their value added would be questionable if differences in liquidity and PI between toxic and 
non-toxic halts can be explained by differences in ex ante volatility (e.g., Andersen and 
Bondarenko, 2015). We run a regression analysis to evaluate the incremental predictive 
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where L is the standardized liquidity metric for trading halt h and five-minute interval t; Toxic 
is a dummy variable that equals one for VPIN-identified toxic halts; Range is the stock-
specific price range in place when the trading halt happens; RV is the standardized realized 
volatility metric; Y
y
, for y = 2003 to 2013, are year dummies, and S
i
, for i = 2 to 45, are stock 
dummies. The dependent variable L is, in turn, RS, DK, or PI, defined and standardized as 
before. The coefficient of interest is βT, which captures differences in each dependent variable 
between toxic and non-toxic halts. We use lags rather than the contemporaneous RV to avoid 
potential endogeneity problems. Finally, we also consider a model with lagged volume 
statistics. Our findings are virtually the same.  
In Table 7, we provide the estimated βT in eq. [3] for static (Panel A) and dynamic (Panel 
B) halts. For each type of halt, we provide findings for VPIN (with time, volume, and trade 
bars) and for VPIN-flag. Due to space considerations, we only present results for the five-














For VPIN with time bars, the differences in liquidity and price impact between toxic and 
non-toxic static halts reported in Table 6 vanish once we control for differences in ex ante 
volatility. For VPIN with volume or trade bars, RS and PI are still found to be significantly 
higher (βT>0) around toxic static halts than around non-toxic static halts. Differences in LOB 
depth, however, disappear. Similarly, for dynamic halts, toxic halts detected by VPIN with 
time or volume bars show higher RS and PI immediately after the VPIN-limit hit than non-
toxic halts. For VPIN with trade bars, differences in ex ante realized volatility explain the 
findings in Table 6. Finally, for both static and dynamic halts, Table 7 corroborates the poor 
performance of VPIN-flag as an early warning signal for toxic events. In general, based on 
our findings we cannot reject that a properly calibrated VPIN may occasionally succeed in 
anticipating truly toxic events. It is important to realize that this preventive ability is, 
nevertheless, limited, since VPIN has a high false positive rate in signaling order flow 
toxicity.  
7. Robustness analyses 
In this section, we summarize extra analyses that provide further support to our main 
findings. Unreported tables are provided in the online appendix of the paper. 
7.1. Robustness of VPIN in signaling toxic halts 
In Section 4, we show that VPIN is sensitive to changes in key design parameters when 
signaling toxic periods. We have also studied the sensitivity of VPIN in signaling toxic halts. 
We find that only 43% of the toxic halts identified by VPIN with 60-second time bars are 
classified as toxic by VPIN with v=2% volume bars. The highest matching score, involving 
time and trade bars, is 53%. The lowest matching scores, between 2.5% and 4.1%, involve 
VPIN-flag.  













In Section 5, we show that VPIN-limit hits often precede extraordinary realized volatility 
(RV), but seldom anticipate extraordinary relative spreads (RS). We perform a similar 
analysis around price-limit hits using the 250 days closest to the event day, with no halts, and 
the same tick regime as benchmark. We find that both RS and, foremost, RV are severe 
around the price-limit hits as often as around VPIN-limit hits. Yet, opponents argue that 
circuit breakers may exacerbate volatility (e.g., Kyle, 1988; Lehmann, 1989; Madhavan, 
1992). Therefore, high RV readings around price-limit hits could be caused, at least partially, 
by the circuit breaker itself. 
7.3. Restarting VPIN 
VPIN measures toxicity in relative terms to its own history. As a result, the metric might 
fail to identify toxic periods that are recent highs but not historical highs. Restarting VPIN 
periodically could alleviate this potential limitation. To provide some insights on this issue, 
we shift the starting point of our VPIN series to December 2008 (VPIN09). In Table 8, we 
show that VPIN09 signals more toxic events from 2009 to 2013 than VPIN with starting 
point January 2002 (VPIN02). Moreover, except for VPIN-flag, VPIN09 locates more toxic 
halts than VPIN02. Indeed, VPIN09 signals as toxic most of the VPIN02-identified toxic 
halts; in contrast, VPIN02 misses many toxic halts signaled by VPIN09. Therefore, we 
confirm that VPIN ignores recent toxic highs unless it is restarted regularly. Determining how 
often to restart VPIN could represent an extra challenge for market authorities. 
[Table 8] 
7.4. VPIN performance in high-frequency and low-frequency environments 
ELO (2011, 2012a) design the VPIN to be a warning signal of order flow toxicity in high 













first-half of our sample period.
9
 However, our main findings still hold if we restrict ourselves 
to the second half of our sample and use VPIN09 instead of VPIN02. We interpret this as 
evidence that our conclusions are not driven by the low-frequency part of our sample.  
7.5. Extreme price changes within VPIN-identified toxic events 
In Section 6, we show that most of the VPIN-identified toxic periods do not comprise 
actual trading halts. However, SSE market authorities revise static and dynamic price limits 
periodically according to the most recent historical volatility of the asset. So, it could be the 
case that toxic periods do contain extraordinary price changes, but the price ranges in place 
are so wide that price limits are rarely hit. In Table 9, we explore this possibility. We provide 
cross-sectional average statistics on the maximum dynamic (Panel A) and static (Panel B) 
price variations within toxic periods with no price-limit hits. No matter the VPIN version, we 
find that the average maximum (both static and dynamic) price variation observed during 
VPIN-signaled toxic periods is much lower than the corresponding benchmark statistic. 
Moreover, for 70 to 80% (81% to 92%) of the toxic events signaled by VPIN, price changes 
never reach the minimum dynamic (static) range of 1% (4%) that can be assigned to an SSE-
listed stock. So, SSE authorities would label the most extreme price variations observed 
within VPIN-identified toxic periods as “tolerable”. This finding is at odds with ELO’s 
(2012a, p. 1486) claim that it takes persistently high levels of VPIN to “reliably generate 
large absolute returns”.  
[Table 9] 
7.6. Extreme illiquidity within VPIN-identified toxic events 
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 The Spanish Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV) estimate that HFTs account for 25-30% of 
the SSE volume traded in 2010 (see CNMV, 2011). For twelve large SSE-listed stocks in 2013, the European 
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In Section 5, we conclude that most of the VPIN-limit hits do not appear to be toxic when 
judged by objective liquidity metrics. This conclusion is based on an examination of how 
liquidity behaves immediately before and after VPIN-limit hits. However, if VPIN were an 
effective advance indicator of order flow toxicity, liquidity withdrawals could happen later in 
the toxic period. In Table 10, we investigate this possibility. We split each VPIN-identified 
toxic event with no trading halts into regular five-minute intervals, compute the average 
relative spread weighted by time (RS) per interval, standardized as in previous tests, and pick 
its maximum realization. We compare this value with the maximum of the standardized RS 
for the same five-minute interval over the corresponding 250 benchmark days. No matter the 
VPIN parameterization, we find significantly worse liquidity realizations during VPIN-
identified non-toxic days than during VPIN-identified toxic events. This analysis reinforces 
our main conclusion that VPIN is neither a reliable proxy nor an effective advance indicator 
for order flow toxicity.   
[Table 10] 
7.7. Calibration 
How should market authorities optimally calibrate VPIN? ELO do not address this 
question. Wu et al. (2013) (hereafter, WGLR) consider 16,000 VPIN parameter combinations 
for futures contracts and rank them by how often high VPIN readings lead extremely high in-
sample realized volatility peaks. WGLR’s in-sample optimization approach raises concerns. 
Should anyone be impressed if, after searching over thousands of VPIN versions, we find a 
constellation of parameters for which VPIN aligns reasonably well with the spikes of realized 
volatility? Some would probably consider this approach as ultimate data snooping. Should an 
in-sample optimized VPIN be optimal out-of-sample too? Probably not; we have already seen 
that it is convenient to restart VPIN periodically. Finally, not all volatility is due to toxicity. 













Despite all our concerns, we calibrate VPIN just to show that even when VPIN is helped 
with an in-sample calibration our conclusions persist. Our calibration exercise differs from 
WGLR in several ways. We fix all the VPIN parameters except the bar type and size because, 
as we have already shown, the ultimate performance of VPIN depends on BVC. In WGLR, 
the BVC parameters are not free. Albeit limited, our calibration exercise suffices to gauge 
whether VPIN improves by fine-tuning some key parameters. We optimize parameters per 
stock, whereas WGLR render uniform optimal parameters. Finally, we label abnormal RV 
(ARV) as “extreme” when it exceeds the 99
th
 percentile of its empirical distribution over the 
benchmark days.
10
 WGLR are more lenient with VPIN; they take the benchmark average RV 
as threshold. We calibrate VPIN over the five-minute interval following each VPIN-limit 
violation. 
Using the calibrated VPIN (hereafter, CVPIN), we corroborate our main findings. The 
percentage of CVPIN-limit hits immediately followed by extreme ARV is 56.1%, much 
higher, as expected, than with uniform bars (21.4%-36.4%). However, differences in ex-post 
liquidity are modest or negligible, meaning that CVPIN also has a high false positive rate in 
signaling toxic order flow. The majority of toxic periods signaled by CVPIN do not contain 
actual trading halts. In Table 11, we use CVPIN instead of VPIN to replicate the analysis 
summarized in Table 7. For CVPIN with time or trade bars, differences in illiquidity (RS) and 
price impact (PI) between CVPIN-signaled toxic and non-toxic halts disappear once we 
control for ex ante volatility. CVPIN with volume bars still shows some preventive capacity, 
mostly for dynamic halts.  
[Table 11] 
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 The abnormal RV (ARV) is the deviation of RV from its benchmark mean divided by its benchmark standard 
deviation. The benchmark consists of the 250 days closest to the event day with no toxicity (VPIN< 0.9), and 













8. Conclusions and final comments 
Financial markets around the world rely on circuit breakers triggered by price limits to 
constrict volatility. Several recent voices question the usefulness of these traditional systems 
in high-frequency markets and advocate for forward-looking types of circuit breakers. ELO 
(2012a) propose the use of VPIN, a new order flow toxicity metric, as a trigger for such type 
of circuit breaker. We evaluate ELO’s proposal by answering two core questions: Is VPIN 
reliable as a proxy for order flow toxicity? Is VPIN efficient as an early warning signal for 
toxic events? 
Consistent with previous studies, we find that within periods of persistent high VPIN 
readings volatility is often substantial. Yet, VPIN-limit hits are also frequently preceded by 
high volatility realizations, providing support to Andersen and Bondarenko’s (2015) critique 
to VPIN. We contribute to the debate by showing that most of the volatility peaks signaled by 
VPIN are not toxic when judged by objective liquidity metrics. In other words, VPIN is not 
reliable as a proxy for order flow toxicity. Thus, implementing VPIN-based circuit breakers 
might result in elevated costs in the form of unnecessary trading cessations. Regulators and 
market authorities should take note of this flaw of the VPIN approach. 
When confronted with actual trading halts, VPIN misses most (above 90%) of the 
abnormal intraday price movements that ultimately lead to price-limit hits. VPIN limits are 
therefore imperfect substitutes for price limits. When VPIN-signaled toxic halts are compared 
with VPIN-signaled non-toxic halts, we find illiquidity and price impact of trades to be more 
pronounced around the former. This finding is encouraging, as it gives some credibility to 
VPIN as an early warning signal for truly toxic events.  
Unfortunately, when we control for ex ante volatility, differences between toxic and non-













matters because, first, it is the specification that more closely aligns with ELO’s volume-
clock paradigm; second, we cannot reject that a well calibrated VPIN can occasionally 
succeed as an advanced indicator of order flow toxicity. The problem is that it only works 
intermittently. VPIN with calibrated volume bars has a false positive rate above 80% in 
signaling order flow toxicity. Also, the most extreme price movements and the worst liquidity 
conditions that can be found during VPIN-identified toxic periods are similar to those we 
observe during non-toxic days.  
Our study exposes practical difficulties of implementing VPIN limits. As in previous 
studies (e.g., Andersen and Bondarenko, 2015; Chakrabarty et al., 2015), we find that VPIN 
is highly sensitive to parameter choices. Our focus is on the type and size of bars, the main 
BVC parameters. For equities, ELO (2016) recommend to carefully calibrating the BVC 
stock by stock, but they do not explain how to do it. Following Wu et al. (2013), we calibrate 
BVC so as to optimize the in-sample forecast power of extreme RV realizations. This 
exercise, however, does not result in a comparable forecast power of extreme illiquidity 
realizations. Indeed, VPIN with uniform bars works as well as VPIN with calibrated bars. As 
ELO (2012a) themselves remark, not all volatility is due to toxicity. Hence, a calibration 
exercise à la Wu et al. (2013) might lead to suboptimal results. An interesting and yet 
unanswered question we leave for future research is whether an in-sample calibrated VPIN 
performs as well out-of-sample. The answer to this question seems pivotal to gauge the 
potential of a VPIN-based circuit breaker. What we do show in this paper is that unless it is 
recalibrated periodically, VPIN could miss toxic events. Determining how often to restart 
VPIN represents an extra challenge for market authorities. 
Our database includes an initiator flag we use to estimate VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN 
computed using the actual order imbalance (OI). ELO (2012a) claim that VPIN should be 













not true. VPIN-flag shows the weakest link with ex-post illiquidity of all the VPIN versions 
we consider, and is the least efficient in anticipating truly toxic events. Our findings 
complement Andersen and Bondarenko (2015) that find a negative association between 
VPIN-flag and posterior short-run volatility. Recently, ELO (2016) advocate for using BVC-
based OI estimates. Initiator-based OI, ELO argue, are no longer linked to information-based 
trading because sophisticated informed traders in modern high-frequency markets use both 
market and limit orders. This argument is supported by independent studies (e.g., Kim and 
Stoll, 2014; Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015). Even if the aggressor flag becomes distorted in 
the presence of HFT, this should not be an issue in the first half of our sample. Yet, VPIN-
flag does not perform any better during the first half of the sample as compared to the second 
half. Therefore, we conclude that the ultimate performance of VPIN depends on BVC.      
Finally, VPIN may have unintended consequences. VPIN limits themselves could enhance 
volatility and harm liquidity. For example, in a sort of magnet effect of VPIN limits, as VPIN 
approaches its limit and a halt starts to look imminent, some traders could advance trades in 
time, exacerbating imbalances and pushing VPIN towards its limit (e.g., Subrahmanyam, 
1994). Liquidity providers that monitor VPIN in real time could also withdraw from the 
market, exacerbating short-term volatility and the price impact of trades. So far, these 
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In Panel A, we provide cross-sectional average daily statistics on trading activity, liquidity, and volatility for our 
sample of SSE-listed stocks and the subsamples with the ten largest (LC) and ten smallest (SC) stocks by market 
capitalization at the beginning of each month. Market capitalization is in millions of euros. The relative spread 
is the quoted spread prevailing before each trade divided by the quote midpoint. The quoted depth is the average 
of the displayed depth in euros at the best quotes prevailing before each trade. We compute the reported daily 
averages weighting by trade size. Trades is the number of trades registered each day. €Volume is the daily 
volume in euros. We report two proxies of volatility: High-Low is the ratio between the highest and the lowest 
price of the day, and Realized Volatility is the daily standard deviation of 1-minute returns. Price is the daily 
average trade price. We provide standard deviations in parenthesis. Panel B provides cross-sectional average 
changes in trading activity, order flow, and liquidity over the sample period (2002-2013) and for two sub-
periods: pre-MiFID (2002-2007) and post-MiFID (2008-2013). Message traffic is the sum of all the order 
submissions, revisions, and cancellations. Depth(€) is the average cumulated depth in euros at the five best ask 
and bid levels. Dispersion is the absolute distance between the quote mid-point and the 5
th
 best LOB level. For 
statistical inference, we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon (1945) test of equality of medians.  
Panel A: Cross-sectional average sample statistics
All (45) 10 largest 10 smallest
Size Market Cap. 12079.42 24992.82 *** 2392.48
(x10
-6
) (15069.08) (16734.15) (526.98)
Liquidity Relative spread 0.1577 0.1241 *** 0.2162
(x100) (0.065) (0.061) (0.105)
Depth (€) 4028.01 4696.52 *** 2726.51
(x10
-2
) (7972.41) (6832.76) (5659.45)
Activity Trades 1506.55 2286.42 *** 873.10
(1475.42) (2050.18) (480.80)
€ Volume 3888.18 7687.05 *** 961.80
(x10
-4
) (7517.35) (10634.96) (462.25)
Volatility High-Low 2.4991 2.1189 ** 2.8748
(x100) (0.508) (0.670) (1.122)
Realized Vol 0.7992 0.4631 *** 1.2125
(x100) (0.449) (0.512) (0.721)
Price 18.00 19.65 * 14.34
(14.42) (11.20) (11.11)
Panel B: Cross-sectional average changes (in %) over the sample period
2002-2013 Pre-MiFID Post-MiFID Dif.
Trades 257.01 46.25 210.76 164.52 ***
Volume (shares) 62.91 38.82 24.09 -14.73 ***
Trade size (shares) -54.37 -5.08 -49.29 -44.21 ***
Message traffic 1957.95 269.62 1688.33 1418.71 ***
Message traffic/trade 476.45 152.74 323.70 170.96 ***
Relative spread -56.41 -41.60 -14.81 26.79 ***
Depth (€) -27.64 273.27 -300.90 -574.17 ***
Dispersion -65.82 41.14 -106.96 -148.10 ***
***,**,* in Panel A (B) mean that the difference between LC (pre-MiFID) and SC (post-MiFID)
















We provide cross-sectional median statistics on the number and duration of toxic events from January 2002 to 
December 2013 for our sample of 45 SSE-listed stocks (interquartile ranges in parenthesis). A toxic event 
begins when the relative VPIN crosses bottom-up a threshold (p) given by the 99
th
 percentile of the VPIN’s 
empirical CDF; it ends when it crosses up-bottom another threshold (q) that correspond to the 85
th
 percentile. 
The length of the VPIN’s rolling window (n) is 50. We use the actual direction of trades (“flag”) and the BVC 
algorithm to obtain order-imbalance estimates. We report results with time, volume, and trade bars. For each bar 
type, we provide median statistics across stocks and different bar sizes. We consider time bars from 30 to 1800 
seconds in increments of 30 seconds, and trade bars (volume bars) from 1% to 40% of the average daily number 
of trades (volume bucket size) over the preceding month. The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily 
volume over the previous month. Persistence in toxicity is measured both in minutes and number of volume 
buckets. We also report the percentage of toxic events that begin and end within the same trading session. For 
statistical inference, we use the non-parametric Wilcoxon (1945) rank-sum test of equality of medians. 
% intraday
Trade classification # Events minutes buckets events
BVC - Time bars 30 302 78.3 56.26
(21.5) (144.6) (30.8) (21.32)
BVC- Volume bars 40 456 *** 55.0 *** 31.25 ***
(25.5) (191.6) (17.3) (15.76)
BVC- Trade bars 46 429 *** 58.0 *** 38.30 ***
(27.3) (124.1) (14.8) (14.16)
Flag 7 7297 *** 447.0 *** 0.00 ***
(9.0) (9750.6) (582.5) (16.67)

















Robustness of VPIN. 
We evaluate the robustness of VPIN when signaling toxic events. In Panel A, we change the bar size within a 
bar type in applying the BVC approach. In Panel B, we change both the bar type (time, trade, or volume) and the 
bar size. We randomly pick two different VPIN specifications and compute the proportion of overlapping toxic 
events. We repeat the process 200 times and obtain the cross-sectional median and interquartile range (in 
parentheses). Time bars span from 30 to 1800 seconds in increments of 30 seconds. Trade bars vary from 1% to 
40% of the of the average daily number of trades over the preceding month (T) in increments of 1%. Volume 
bars vary from 1% to 40% of the volume bucket size (V) in increments of 1%. The volume bucket size is 1/50 
times the average daily volume over the preceding month. In Panel A, we also provide separated statistics for 
randomly matched VPIN specifications with close and distant bars. We classify two bars as being “close in size” 
when their size differs less than 5 minutes in case of time bars, or less than 10%T (10%V) in case of trade 
(volume) bars, respectively. A toxic event begins when the relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of each 
VPIN reading) crosses bottom-up the VPIN threshold p=0.99; it ends when it crosses up-bottom a second 
threshold q=0.85. In computing VPIN, we use a rolling window of 50 volume buckets. For statistical inference, 
we use the non-parametric rank-sum test of Wilcoxon (1945). 
Panel A: Robustness to changes in the bar size (within a bar type)
Bar type % matches % matches % matches
Time 0.7072 < 5 min. 0.7508 > 15 min. 0.6509 ‡‡‡
(0.0674) (0.0321) (0.0783)
Volume 0.5835 ††† < 10%V 0.6133 > 20%V 0.5338 ‡‡‡
(0.0578) (0.0337) (0.0449)
Trade 0.6837 < 10%T 0.7731 > 20%T 0.5283 ‡‡‡
(0.1822) (0.0597) (0.0746)
Panel B: Robustness to changes in the bar type
Bar type % matches % matches % matches
Time 0.2910 0.4788 ***
(0.0480) (0.0413)
Volume 0.2120 0.2812 ***
(0.0282) (0.1184)
Trade 0.3508 *** 0.2850
(0.0184) (0.1488)
†††, ††, † means different than the time bars case at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
‡‡‡,‡‡,‡ means different than the "close in size" case at the 1%, 5% amd 10% level, respectively.
***, **, * means different than the other statistic in the same row at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
All cases Close in size Distant in size

















Illiquidity and volatility around VPIN-limit hits. 
We study liquidity and volatility around VPIN-limit hits. A VPIN-limit is hit when the relative VPIN crosses 
bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99. For each VPIN-limit hit, we compare the post-event relative spread (RS) and 




percentiles of the empirical distribution of those same metrics over 





the same distribution. The benchmark period consists of the 250 days closest to the event day with no toxicity 
and the same tick regime. We split the benchmark days in regular 5-minute intervals. Liquidity and volatility 
metrics are standardized using the benchmark mean and standard deviation for the same 5-minute interval. RS is 
the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint. DK is the average between the accumulated euro-volume at 
the five best bid and offer quotes of the LOB. Liquidity proxies are averaged weighting by time. RV is the 
standard deviation of the 1-minute price changes within each 5-minute interval. We provide the proportion of 
events with extreme illiquidity and volatility readings for two pre-event and two post-event 5-minute intervals 
centered on the VPIN-limit violation. We also provide the cross-sectional average deviation of the standardized 
metric in the pre- or post-event interval from the benchmark percentile. Statistical test are based on the non-
parametric Wilcoxon (1945) rank-sum test for equality of medians. In implementing the BVC, we report results 
for 1-minute time bars, trade bars of 2% of the average daily number of trades over the previous month, and 
volume bars of 2% of the volume bucket size. The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily volume over 
the previous month. We also report results for VPIN-flag (VPIN computed using the actual direction of trades). 













[-10 -5) % 18.63 9.80 6.45 3.04 40.36 28.64
Dif. -0.878 *** -2.083 *** 1.534 1.715 *** 0.76 *** -0.46 ***
[-5 0) % 20.30 10.48 5.31 2.65 62.46 49.56
Dif. -0.845 *** -2.048 *** 1.731 *** 1.910 *** 4.09 *** 2.86 ***
[0 5) % 22.81 12.20 6.17 3.28 51.45 39.10
Dif. -0.735 *** -1.940 *** 1.403 1.585 *** 1.60 0.38 ***
[5 10) % 18.23 9.74 6.12 3.32 41.52 27.80
Dif. -1.041 *** -2.248 *** 1.377 *** 1.558 *** 0.57 *** -0.65 ***
Panel B: Volume bars (v  = 2%)
[-10 -5) % 18.31 8.38 8.81 4.38 28.25 17.56
Dif. -0.941 *** -2.205 *** 1.126 1.298 *** -0.44 *** -1.62 ***
[-5 0) % 21.37 9.30 8.30 4.02 34.95 23.07
Dif. -0.829 *** -2.092 *** 1.235 *** 1.408 *** 0.28 *** -0.91 ***
[0 5) % 26.52 12.52 9.01 4.73 42.48 29.57
Dif. -0.643 *** -1.910 *** 1.103 *** 1.275 *** 0.72 *** -0.47 ***
[5 10) % 19.62 8.27 9.49 5.58 25.83 15.71
Dif. -1.019 *** -2.283 *** 1.002 *** 1.175 *** -0.74 *** -1.93 ***
*** Means the post-event level is different than the benchmark percentile at the 1% level across all toxic events.















Table 4 (Cont.) 
Illiquidity and volatility around VPIN-limit hits. 













[-10 -5) % 24.41 11.96 9.25 4.50 38.20 26.82
Dif. -0.698 *** -1.889 *** 0.976 *** 1.142 *** 0.59 *** -0.65 ***
[-5 0) % 23.30 10.97 9.36 4.83 45.93 33.94
Dif. -0.727 *** -1.920 *** 1.059 *** 1.225 *** 1.60 *** 0.37 ***
[0 5) % 26.04 14.09 9.84 5.01 44.96 31.95
Dif. -0.692 *** -1.882 *** 0.973 1.140 *** 1.01 *** -0.22 ***
[5 10) % 22.99 11.46 9.58 4.85 35.85 23.04
Dif. -0.823 *** -2.015 *** 0.944 *** 1.112 *** 0.10 *** -1.14 ***
Panel D: Flag
[-10 -5) % 6.99 2.62 4.37 1.57 13.64 7.17
Dif. -1.724 *** -2.850 *** 1.981 *** 2.163 *** -1.44 *** -2.62 ***
[-5 0) % 5.27 2.28 3.87 2.28 17.05 9.14
Dif. -1.774 *** -2.903 *** 2.071 *** 2.252 *** -1.31 *** -2.48 ***
[0 5) % 6.63 2.58 4.60 2.39 21.55 12.89
Dif. -1.656 *** -2.785 *** 1.940 *** 2.122 *** -0.76 *** -1.94 ***
[5 10) % 8.72 3.38 4.63 1.60 15.48 7.47
Dif. -1.672 *** -2.798 *** 1.809 *** 1.991 *** -1.37 *** -2.55 ***
*** Means the post-event level is different than the benchmark percentile at the 1% level across all toxic events.
















VPIN-limit vs. price-limit hits. 
In Panel A, we provide summary statistics on the number of SSE toxic halts within our sample. A halt is toxic if 
it falls within a toxic period according to the VPIN metric. A toxic period begins when the relative VPIN (i.e., 
cumulated probability of each VPIN value) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p and ends when it crosses up-
bottom a second threshold q. We report results for p = 0.99 and q = 0.85. In computing VPIN, we use a rolling 
window of n = 50 volume buckets. The volume bucket size equals 1/50 times the average daily volume over the 
preceding month. In implementing the BVC, we report results for 1-minute time bars, trade bars of 2% of the 
average daily number of trades over the previous month, and volume bars of 2% of volume bucket size. The 
volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily volume over the previous month. We also report results for 
VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN computed using the actual direction of trades. A halt is static (dynamic) if it is 
triggered by a violation of the static (dynamic) price limit. Static limits are set over the allocation price of the 
last auction. Dynamic limits are set over the last trade price. In Panel B, we show the percentage of VPIN-
identified toxic periods that comprise at least one trading halt. For those periods, we report the median distance 
(in minutes) and interquartile range from the VPIN-limit violation to price-limit violation that leads to the 
closest toxic halt. Finally, we show the proportion of toxic halts that happen before the end of the session where 
the VPIN-limit violation occurs, and the proportion of toxic halts that happen in the 60-minute interval 
following the VPIN-limit violation. 
VPIN version Halts % halts % halts %
Time bars (60 sec.) 508 7.54 250 8.41 258 6.81
Volume bars (v  = 2%) 484 7.19 161 5.47 323 8.52
Trade bars (v  = 2%) 654 9.71 344 11.69 310 8.18
Flag 299 4.44 155 5.27 144 3.80
Total With toxic In the same Within the next
VPIN version events halts (%) min. iqr. session (%) hour (%)
Time bars (60 sec.) 1364 20.23 78.7 (233.4) 48.82 27.56
Volume bars (v  = 2%) 1589 14.60 200.1 (460.7) 24.79 11.98
Trade bars (v  = 2%) 1673 19.61 138.5 (408.4) 38.53 20.03
Flag 556 19.1 928.7 (2311.6) 7.69 3.68
Distance to the halt
Static halts Dynamic halts
Panel A: Toxic trading halts
Toxic halts
















Toxic halts vs. non-toxic halts. 
We test the null hypothesis that market conditions around SSE VPIN-located toxic and non-toxic static halts are 
alike. Similar results for dynamic halts are reported in the online appendix. Static halts are triggered by 
violations of the static price limit, set around the allocation price of the last auction. There are 2,943 static halts 
in our sample. A halt is toxic if it falls within a toxic event according to VPIN. A toxic event begins when the 
relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of VPIN values) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 
(VPIN-limit violation) and ends when the relative VPIN crosses up-bottom a second threshold q = 0.85. We 
report results for VPIN with the BVC algorithm with 1-minute time bars (Panel A), volume bars of 2% of 
volume bucket size (Panel B), and trade bars of 2% of the average daily number of trades over the previous 
month (Panel C). The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily volume over the previous month. The 
relative spread (RS) is the quoted spread divided by the quote midpoint averaged weighting by time. The LOB 
depth (DK) is the accumulated displayed depth at the five best ask and bid quotes in euros also averaged 
weighting by time. Realized volatility (RV) is the standard deviation of the 1-minute price changes. The price 
impact (PI) is the difference between the quote midpoint one minute after the trade and the quote midpoint 
prevailing before the trade, averaged weighting by trade size. All the metrics are standardized by subtracting the 
mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the corresponding variable for the exact same time interval 
across 250 non-toxic benchmark days with no trading halts. We use Wilcoxon’s (1945) rank-sum test to provide 
statistical significance to differences between toxic and non-toxic halts. We use a 30-minute window centered 
on the trading halt that we split into five-minute intervals.  
Panel A: Static halts and VPIN with time bars (60 sec.)
[-15 -10) 2.019 *** 0.766 *** 0.107 1.074 ***
[-10 -5) 2.840 *** 0.965 *** 0.072 1.720 ***
[-5 0) 2.766 *** 0.942 *** 0.092 2.084 ***
[0 5) 4.956 *** 1.197 *** 0.188 1.769 ***
[5 10) 2.437 *** 1.539 *** 0.059 1.062 ***
[10 15) 1.536 *** 1.022 *** 0.021 1.075 ***
Panel B: Static halts and VPIN with volume bars (v  = 2%)
[-15 -10) 1.285 ** 1.676 *** -0.258 *** 1.579 ***
[-10 -5) 1.347 *** 1.736 *** -0.240 *** 2.610 ***
[-5 0) 1.878 *** 1.587 *** -0.333 *** 4.117 ***
[0 5) 4.612 *** 1.792 *** -0.153 *** 2.978 ***
[5 10) 1.771 *** 1.583 *** -0.184 *** 1.782 ***
[10 15) 0.516 1.448 *** -0.202 *** 0.951
Panel C: Static halts and VPIN with trade bars (v  = 2%)
[-15 -10) 1.466 *** 0.732 *** -0.154 *** 1.229 ***
[-10 -5) 1.758 *** 1.027 *** -0.198 *** 1.360 ***
[-5 0) 2.638 *** 1.138 *** -0.192 *** 2.278 ***
[0 5) 3.733 *** 1.272 *** -0.034 ** 2.034 ***
[5 10) 1.839 *** 1.474 *** -0.128 *** 1.468 ***
[10 15) 1.630 *** 1.193 *** -0.143 *** 0.953 ***
Panel D: Static halts and VPIN-flag
[-15 -10) 0.312 ** -0.133 0.247 ** -0.121
[-10 -5) 0.202 -0.184 0.188 *** -0.017
[-5 0) 0.419 * -0.126 0.221 *** -0.411
[0 5) 0.181 -0.060 0.284 ** 0.029
[5 10) -0.010 -0.067 0.224 ** -0.290
[10 15) 0.236 -0.084 0.215 -0.480
***, **, * means statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.















Toxic halts vs. non-toxic halts: regression analysis. 
We test the null that differences in market conditions between toxic and non-toxic halts are driven by 
differences in volatility. A halt is toxic when it falls within a toxic event, which begins when the relative VPIN 
(i.e., the cumulated probability of VPIN values) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 and ends when it 
crosses up-bottom a second threshold q = 0.85. We use data on 6,734 trading halts for 45 SSE-listed stocks from 
2002 to 2013. We distinguish between static halts (Panel A) and dynamic halts (Panel B). Static (dynamic) halts 
are triggered by violations of price limits set around the allocation price of the last auction (the last trade price). 
There are 2,943 static halts and 3,791 dynamic halts. We provide results for VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN computed 
with the actual trade direction. We also provide results for VPIN with the BVC algorithm and three types of 
bars: 60-second time bars, 2% volume bars, and 2% trade bars. Dependent variables are the average relative 
spread (RS), the average LOB depth (DK), both weighted by time, and the average price impact of trades (PI) 
weighted by trade size. Explanatory variables are the first three lags of realized volatility (RV) – the standard 
deviation of the 1-minute price changes, a dummy variable for toxic halts (Toxic), and the stock-specific price 
range at the time of the halt (Range), either static or dynamic. As controls, we include 11 yearly dummies and 
44 stock dummies. We only report the estimated coefficient of the variable of interest: Toxic. The model is 
defined for five-minute intervals around trading halts. We report estimated coefficients for the first interval 
preceding and the first interval following the halt. The model is estimated by OLS with White-robust standard 
errors. 
Panel A: Static halts
Toxic coef. [-5,0) (0,5] [-5,0) (0,5] [-5,0) (0,5]
Time bars 0.140 0.382 0.242 *** 0.255 ** 1.334 0.823
Adj.-R
2
0.229 0.123 0.094 0.082 0.106 0.071
F-test 17.200 15.146 10.560 7.231 12.843 7.836
Volume bars 0.702 *** 0.687 *** -0.003 0.111 2.580 * 1.913 **
Adj.-R
2
0.241 0.124 0.111 0.096 0.105 0.078
F-test 17.983 16.290 16.023 10.451 14.203 8.068
Trade bars 0.553 *** 0.566 ** -0.036 0.108 1.932 * 1.239 **
Adj.-R
2
0.234 0.139 0.109 0.097 0.104 0.069
F-test 17.561 15.284 11.213 10.108 13.563 7.543
Flag -0.128 -0.173 0.143 0.234 * -0.753 -0.110
Adj.-R
2
0.233 0.131 0.094 0.080 0.110 0.067
F-test 17.637 14.498 10.748 6.655 13.880 7.237
Obs. 2821 2835 2821 2835 2760 2787
Panel B: Dynamic halts
Time bars 0.769 * 1.221 *** 0.151 ** 0.298 *** 1.132 1.850 **
Adj.-R
2
0.238 0.203 0.007 0.060 0.027 0.182
F-test 13.867 17.138 2.430 7.240 2.977 5.920
Volume bars 0.921 ** 1.107 *** -0.034 0.133 2.668 ** 2.022 **
Adj.-R
2
0.254 0.217 0.008 0.068 0.030 0.193
F-test 16.861 21.914 6.319 11.440 3.039 5.808
Trade bars 0.166 0.831 * -0.032 0.092 2.066 * 0.736
Adj.-R
2
0.243 0.214 0.008 0.054 0.028 0.207
F-test 12.278 15.712 2.091 6.679 3.624 6.024
Flag 0.172 0.471 -0.003 0.143 3.749 -0.234
Adj.-R
2
0.197 0.164 0.006 0.055 0.039 0.142
F-test 13.276 16.366 2.022 6.391 3.413 5.276
Obs. 2844 2953 2844 2953 2557 2619

















We study the sensitivity of VPIN to the starting point of the series. We consider two starting points: January 
2002 (“VPIN02”) and January 2009 (“VPIN09”). For each case, we obtain the number of toxic events and toxic 
halts between 2009 and 2013. A toxic event begins when the relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of 
each VPIN observation) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 (VPIN-limit violation) and ends when it 
crosses up-bottom another threshold q = 0.85. For both toxic events and toxic halts, we provide the total number 
of events for the whole sample (“All”) and the average number of events across stocks (“Avg.”). We use the 
non-parametric Wilcoxon’s rank-sum test to compare VPIN02 and VPIN09. Finally, we provide the proportion 
of VPIN02-identified toxic halts also pinpointed by VPIN09, and the proportion of VPIN09-identified toxic 
halts located by VPIN02 too. We apply the BVC algorithm to assign direction to trades. We report results 
implementing BVC using 60-second time bars, 2% volume bars (over the volume bucket size), and 2% trade 
bars (over the average number of trades of the asset over the previous month). The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 
of the average daily volume over the previous month. We also report results using VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN 
computed using the actual direction of trades. 
VPIN version All Avg. All Avg. All Avg. All Avg. VPIN02 VPIN09
Time bars (60 sec.) 349 7.76 591 13.13 *** 56 1.24 83 1.84 ** 89.29 60.24
Volume bars (v  = 2%) 142 3.16 733 16.29 *** 18 0.40 54 1.20 *** 100.00 33.33
Trade bars (v  = 2%) 318 7.07 831 18.47 *** 81 1.80 150 3.33 *** 95.06 51.33
Flag 157 3.49 217 4.82 74 1.64 65 1.44 59.46 67.69
***, **, * means that the average per stock with VPIN09 is different than with VPIN02 at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Toxic events Toxic halts Matched
















Static and dynamic price variations within toxic periods. 
This table provides summary statistics (cross-sectional mean and standard deviation) on the maximum dynamic 
(Panel A) and static (Panel B) price variations within toxic periods according to the VPIN. We also provide the 
distribution of dynamic (Panel A) and static (Panel B) price variations with respect to SSE pre-established 
categories of dynamic and static ranges. A dynamic price variation is the relative change in prices with respect 
to the previous transaction price. A static price variation is the relative change in prices with respect to the static 
price, that is, the allocation price of the last auction completed. We also provide the average 99
th
 percentile and 
the maximum of both dynamic and static price variations across benchmark periods. Each benchmark period is 
event-specific, and given by the 250 days closest to the toxic event with no remarkable toxicity, no trading halts, 
and the same tick regime. A toxic event begins when the relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of each 
VPIN observation) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 (VPIN-limit violation) and ends when it crosses 
up-bottom another threshold q = 0.85. We consider different VPIN implementations. We report results using the 
BVC algorithm with 60-second time bars, 2% volume bars (over the volume bucket size), and 2% trade bars 
(over the average number of trades of the asset over the previous month). The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the 
average daily volume over the previous month. We also report results using VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN computed 
using the actual direction of trades. 
Panel A: Price changes with respect to the dynamic price
VPIN version Max. Std. 99
th
Max. <=1% (min) <=2% <=3% <=4%
Time bars (60 sec.) 0.0072 0.0051 0.0040 *** 0.0191 *** 79.67 97.60 99.63 99.91
Volume bars (v  = 2%) 0.0072 0.0048 0.0042 *** 0.0176 *** 78.82 98.01 99.63 99.93
Trade bars (v  = 2%) 0.0082 0.0058 0.0040 *** 0.0203 *** 73.97 95.51 99.03 99.93
Flag 0.0083 0.0047 0.0049 *** 0.0211 *** 70.76 98.66 99.55 100.00
Panel B: Price changes with respect to the static price
VPIN version Max. Std. 99
th
Max. <=4% (min) <=5% <=7% <=8%
Time bars (60 sec.) 0.0282 0.0175 0.0364 *** 0.0567 *** 81.33 91.59 97.50 98.61
Volume bars (v  = 2%) 0.0224 0.0137 0.0395 *** 0.0604 *** 91.88 97.34 99.19 99.56
Trade bars (v  = 2%) 0.0290 0.0182 0.0387 *** 0.0613 *** 79.58 89.75 96.34 97.83
Flag 0.0277 0.0199 0.0426 *** 0.0674 *** 82.14 89.06 95.76 97.54
*** means statistically different from the cross-sectional average maximum price variation within toxic events a the 1% level.
Toxic periods Benchmark period w.r.t. standardized SSE static limits
Distribution of max. dynamic price change (%)
Toxic periods Benchmark period w.r.t. stadardized SSE dynamic limits















Highest relative spread realizations within toxic periods. 
This table provides cross-sectional average statistics about extreme relative spread realizations during both 
VPIN-identified toxic periods and non-toxic (benchmark) days. A toxic event begins when the relative VPIN 
(i.e., the cumulated probability of each VPIN observation) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 (VPIN-
limit violation) and ends when it crosses up-bottom another threshold q = 0.85. We split each toxic period into 
five-minute intervals, and compute the standardized relative spread weighted by time (RS) within each interval. 
We pick the maximum RS across intervals, which we compare with the same statistic, for the same interval, but 
over the corresponding benchmark days. The event-specific benchmark period is given by the 250 days closest 
to the toxic event with no remarkable toxicity, no trading halts, and the same tick regime. Each RS observation 
is standardized using the RS mean and standard deviation across the benchmark days for the same five-minute 
interval. We report standardized metrics in Panel A, and the corresponding raw metrics in basis points in Panel 
B. We also provide the percentage of toxic events for which the maximum RS is below the benchmark readings. 
We compute VPIN with BVC-based order imbalance estimates. We report results using the BVC algorithm with 
60-second time bars, 2% volume bars (over the volume bucket size), and 2% trade bars (over the average 
number of trades of the asset over the previous month). The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily 
volume over the previous month. We also report results using VPIN-flag, that is, VPIN computed using the 
actual direction of trades. 
Panel A: Standardized RS (in standard deviations from the benchmark mean)
VPIN version Max. Std. Max. < bench.(%)
Time bars (60 sec.) 2.60 3.22 5.07 *** 87.89
Volume bars (2%) 3.30 3.32 5.02 *** 81.80
Trade bars (2%) 3.64 4.17 4.89 *** 77.29
Flag 3.18 4.58 4.77 *** 81.98
Panel B: Raw RS  values (in basis points)
VPIN version Max. Std. Max. < bench.(%)
Time bars (60 sec.) 42.76 37.46 69.74 *** 84.64
Volume bars (2%) 51.07 41.06 69.55 *** 79.04
Trade bars (2%) 49.33 41.36 65.23 *** 77.74
Flag 51.46 41.21 75.23 *** 82.65
***, **,* Means statistically different from the toxic periods a the 1%, 5% and 10%  level, respectively.
Toxic periods Benchmark periods
















Toxic halts vs. non-toxic halts with calibrated bars. 
We use a regression approach to test the null that differences in market conditions between toxic and non-toxic 
halts are driven by differences in volatility. A halt is toxic when it falls within a toxic event, which begins when 
the relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of VPIN values) crosses bottom-up the VPIN limit p = 0.99 
and ends when it crosses up-bottom a second threshold q = 0.85. We use data on 6,734 trading halts for 45 SSE-
listed stocks from 2002 to 2013. We distinguish between static halts (Panel A) and dynamic halts (Panel B). 
Static (dynamic) halts are triggered by violations of price limits set around the allocation price of the last auction 
(the last trade price). There are 2,943 static halts and 3,791 dynamic halts. We use calibrated time, volume, and 
trade bars. Dependent variables are the average relative spread (RS), the average LOB depth (DK), both 
weighted by time, and the average price impact of trades (PI) weighted by trade size. As explanatory variables 
we use the first three lags of realized volatility (RV) – the standard deviation of the 1-minute price changes, a 
dummy variable for toxic halts (Toxic), and the stock-specific price range at the time of the halt (Range), either 
static or dynamic. As controls, we include 11 yearly dummies and 44 stock dummies. We only report the 
estimated coefficient of the variable of interest: Toxic. The model is defined for five-minute intervals around 
trading halts. We report estimated coefficients for the first interval preceding and the first interval following the 
halt. The model is estimated by OLS with White-robust standard errors. 
Panel A: Static halts
Toxic coef. [-5,0) (0,5] [-5,0) (0,5] [-5,0) (0,5]
Time bars -0.126 -0.234 0.172 ** 0.192 ** -0.216 0.232
Adj.-R
2
0.217 0.115 0.089 0.080 0.101 0.068
F-test 17.426 14.920 9.446 6.918 13.780 7.509
Volume bars 0.831 *** 0.385 * -0.169 *** -0.025 1.633 1.375 **
Adj.-R
2
0.247 0.140 0.122 0.106 0.105 0.069
F-test 19.128 17.052 15.367 10.959 13.776 8.301
Trade bars 0.076 -0.044 0.044 0.019 0.331 0.148
Adj.-R
2
0.219 0.133 0.104 0.098 0.105 0.064
F-test 17.745 13.482 10.623 9.454 13.478 7.148
Obs. 2821 2835 2821 2835 2760 2787
Panel B: Dynamic halts
Time bars 0.444 0.944 0.190 ** 0.243 ** 0.320 -0.064
Adj.-R
2
0.236 0.203 0.006 0.051 0.027 0.169
F-test 12.358 14.864 1.914 5.965 3.267 6.195
Volume bars 1.218 *** 1.372 *** -0.134 0.012 2.484 ** 1.983 ***
Adj.-R
2
0.268 0.224 0.009 0.064 0.029 0.191
F-test 16.276 19.816 6.721 11.545 3.334 6.261
Trade bars 0.194 0.848 * 0.030 0.123 -0.052 -0.062
Adj.-R
2
0.234 0.205 0.008 0.056 0.026 0.149
F-test 12.686 15.870 2.278 6.320 3.022 5.159
Obs. 2844 2953 2844 2953 2557 2619
















Abnormal liquidity, volatility, and activity patterns around VPIN-limit hits. 
We plot average abnormal liquidity, volatility and trading activity levels around VPIN-limit violations for our 
sample of 45 Spanish SIBE-listed stocks from January 2002 to December 2013. A toxic event begins when the 
relative VPIN (i.e., the cumulated probability of the VPIN) crosses bottom-up the p = 0.99 limit (“VPIN-limit 
violation”). Order imbalances are estimated using the BVC algorithm with 60-second time bars, 2% volume bars 
(over the volume bucket size) and 2% trade bars (over the average number of trades of the asset over the 
previous month). The volume bucket size is 1/50
th
 of the average daily volume over the previous month. For 
each event, we take the closest 250 non-toxic days as the benchmark period. We consider twenty-four 5-minute 
intervals centered on the VPIN-limit violation. Each 5-minute interval observation is standardized by 
subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the same metric during the exact same interval 
across all the benchmark days. We plot averages across all VPIN-limit violations. Statistically significant 
abnormal values are highlighted using different markers per variable. Statistical tests are based on the Wilcoxon 
(1945) signed rank-sum test. We use volume in shares (VOL) to proxy for trading activity – Figure 1.a. We 
measure realized volatility as the standard deviation of the 1-minute changes in trade prices (RV) – Figure 1.b. 
Finally, we use the relative spread (RS) – Figure 1.c, and the displayed LOB depth in euros at the best quotes 
(DB) – Figure 1.d, all weighted by time, as inverse and direct proxies for liquidity, respectively.  
 
1.1. Volume (shares) 
 




































































































Figure 1 (Cont.) 
Abnormal liquidity, volatility, and activity patterns around VPIN-limit hits. 
 
 
1.3. Relative bid-ask spread 
 







































































































Abnormal liquidity, volatility, and activity patterns around price-limit hits. 
We plot the average abnormal relative spread (RS), realized volatility (RV) and volume (VOL) around SSE 
single-stock trading halts, known as “volatility auctions”. Our sample consists of 45 Spanish SIBE-listed stocks 
from January 2002 to December 2013. We distinguish between static (Figure 2.a) and dynamic (Figure 2.b) 
halts. A static halt is triggered by a violation of the static price limits, the maximum variation permitted around 
the static price. The static price is the allocation price of the last auction completed. A dynamic halt is triggered 
by a violation of the dynamic price limits, the maximum variation allowed around the last trade price. We 
consider twelve five-minute intervals before the price limit hit and twelve five-minute intervals after the 
resumption of the continuous session. RS is the bid-ask spread divided by the quote midpoint; RV is the standard 
deviation of the one-minute changes in prices, and VOL is measured in shares. For each event, we take the 250 
days closest in time with the same tick regime and no trading halts as the benchmark period. Each observation is 
standardized by subtracting the mean and dividing by the standard deviation of the same variable for the exact 
same time interval across the 250 benchmark days. We plot averages across all trading halts. Statistically 
significant abnormal values are highlighted using different markers per variable. Statistical significance is 
evaluated using Wilcoxon (1945) non-parametric test. 
 
2.1. Static halts 
 

































































































Parameterization of VPIN and BVC 
We summarize our parameter choices for implementing the order flow toxicity measure VPIN with the bulk-
volume classification (BVC) algorithm.  
VPIN Description Alternatives considered 
n Number of volume buckets in 
each update of VPIN 
25, 50, 75 
δ Percentage of the daily average 
volume 
1/50 
𝑉𝑖  Size of the volume bucket for 
stock i 
δ times the average daily trading volume of the asset 
over the preceding month, rounded to the closest 
integer. 
𝑂𝐼𝑖𝜏  Order imbalance for stock i in 
the τ-th volume bucket 
BVC-based order flow imbalance 
OI based on the actual direction of trades  
BVC   
Bar types Data is pre-aggregated into bars 
of equal size 
Time, trade and volume bars. 
Bar size Pre-determined bar sizes Time bars (in seconds):  
From 30 to 1800, in increments of 30 seconds (i.e., 60 
different bars). 
Trade bars (in number of trades):  
Stock-specific: from 1% to 40%, in increments of 1%, 
of the average daily number of trades over the 
preceding month, rounded to the closest integer (i.e., 
40 different bars) 
Volume bars (in shares traded): 
Stock-specific: from 1% to 40%, in increments of 1%, 
of 1/50
th
 of the average daily volume (in shares) over 
the preceding month, rounded to the closest integer 
(i.e., 40 different bars) 
Φ(∙) CDF of the probabilistic 
distribution assumed for the 
standardized changes in prices 
between two consecutive bars 
t-student with 0.1 and 0.25 degrees of freedom 
Normal 
 
[p, q]  Thresholds for the CDF of VPIN [0.99,0.85], [0.95,0.85] 
 
 
 
 
